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rejected defendant's contention that General Municipal Law § 50-i
did not supersede the Public Housing Law with respect to the time
for commencement of the action. The court reasoned that "logic
leads to the conclusion that Section 157 of the Public Housing
Law is also superseded . . . concerning the time to commence
the suit." 12
At first glance, the decision appears to be nothing more than
a determination that one statute supersedes another. However
noteworthy that may be, the case should alert the practitioner to the
significance of the following: One, Section 5 0-e of the General
Municipal Law must be read in conjunction with section 50-i;
two, subdivision (2) of section 50-i effectively eliminates the
problem of any inconsistent statute although not expressly repealing
any of them. It seems clear, therefore, that in all cases founded
on a theory of municipal tort liability, reliance may not be
predicated upon any statute which is inconsistent with the time
provisions of Sections 50-e and 50-i of the General Municipal
Law.
One caveat seems appropriate with respect to suing a municipality, viz., time is always of the essence since it seems that there
will be no deviations permitted, no matter how slight, from the
provisions of Sections 50-e and 50-i of the General Municipal
Law.
CPLR 203(e) :13 Lack of notice in original answer of "claims"
interposed in amended answer prevents "relation back."
In a recent case,1 4 the plaintiff served a complaint in January
1962. The cause of action contained therein was based on a sale
which occurred in 1960. Defendant's answer contained no counterclaim. However, in an amended answer, interposed in June 1964,
defendant asserted counterclaims which alleged conversion by plain12 Section 50-i prohibits suit prior to thirty days from the service of a
notice of claim, or after one year and ninety days from the accrual of the
cause of action. Hlanko v. New York City Housing Authority, mupra note

11, at 365, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 708. It should be noted that Sections 50-e and

50-i of the General Municipal Law deal only with tort liablity and, therefore, in cases which are founded, for instance, on breach of contract, the
statute will not apply. The reason for this is that the legislature has not
seen fit, as yet, to enact a unifying provision with respect to all causes of
action against a municipality. Regrettably, therefore, in cases other than
those founded on tort liability, resort must be had to the laws of each
municipality to determine the time within which the action must be commenced.
2
13For a succinct discussion of the background of CPLR
03(e) see
The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39 ST. JoHrN'S L. REV. 178,

184-85 (1964).

U4Nichimen & Co. v. Framen Steel Supply Co., 44 Misc. 2d 260, 253
N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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tiff in March 1961. A conversion action is governed by a threeyear statute of limitations. 15 Defendant cited CPLR 203(c)
as authority for the contention that the counterclaims should have
been deemed interposed at the time of the interposition of the
complaint. The court held that CPLR 203(c) pertains only to a
defense or counterclaim asserted in an original pleading, and that
the section must be read in conjunction with CPLR 203(e) 16
which deals specifically with claims in amended pleadings. The
court went on to state that "the import of subdivisions (c) and
(e) is to allow the assertion of claims which become time-barred
after a pleading has been interposed which contains notice that
the transaction concerned will be the subject of litigation,""
but that no such prior pleading was present here.
The counterclaims were contained in an amended pleading and,
therefore, the requirements of 203(e) had to be met first. This
defect proved fatal to the defendant. Since there were no "claims"
in the original answer, there could be no notice given by such
a pleading of the transactions and/or occurrences to be proven
in the amended answer. Thus, the amended answer could not be
related back to the original answer. Failing to meet the requirements of 203(e), the defendant was precluded from availing itself
of the benefit of 203(c) and could not, therefore, avoid the
bar of the statute of limitations.
An interesting question is raised by the instant case, although
the court made no mention of it. CPLR 203(e) provides that
"a claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have
been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading
were interposed. . .

."

It is submitted that if the defendant's

original answer had contained an affirmative defense which satisfied
the notice requirement of 203(e), the court would have permitted
relation back of the amended pleading, although there was no
"claim" contained in the original pleading. Professor McLaughlin,
in his Practice Commentary to CPLR 203(e), lends support to
this argument. He states: "Subdivision (e) abrogates the rule
of Harris v. Tams." 's That case had strictly applied the notice
requirement with respect to amended pleadings. In enacting 203 (e),
the legislature was attempting to liberalize these rules. 19 It follows
1 CPLR 214(3).

16 CPLR 203(e) permits relation of a claim in an amended pleading to
the time when the claims in the original pleading were interposed, provided
the original pleading gives notice "of the transactions, occurrences, or series
of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended
pleading."
31Nichimen & Co. v. Framen Steel Supply Co., supra note 14,
at 262, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 715.

18 7B

McKINNEY'S, CPLR 203, practice commentary 83

(1964).

See

Harris v. Tams, 258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932).
19 CPLR 203(e) is intended to "overcome the effect of Harris v. Tanis."
SECOND REP. 51.
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logically, therefore, that if a claim asserted in an original pleading
can give notice, certainly a defense can do likewise and enable the
avoidance of the bar of the statute of limitations.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERvIcE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT

Expansion of jurisdiction under CPLR 302 does not broaden
the "doing business" concept.
The fact that the federal constitution permits a state to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under
the "minimum contacts" 20 theory does not compel the state to
expand its concept of "doing business." 21 Subsequent to the case of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 2 while it was clear that
the New York Legislature could expand jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, due to legislative inactivity, the courts were
confined solely to the "doing business" test until CPLR 302 was
enacted. 23 Since the effective date of the CPLR, a foreign corporation, although not "doing business," will be held in personam
if it is "transacting business" provided, however, that the cause
of action arises out of that business."4 Considerably less is required for "transacting business" than is required by the "doing
business" test. It must be noted, however, that the "doing business"
test has not been altered, and if CPLR 302 is inapplicable to a
case, the non-resident defendant must be "present" in order to be
26
25
To be "present" is to be "doing business.
held in personam.

20McGee

v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Inter-

national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

21 Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1952);
see Fremay, Inc. v. Modern Plastic Mach. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 235, 239,
222 N.Y.S.2d 694, 699 (1st Dep't 1961); Ames v. Senco Prods., Inc., 1 App.
Div. 222d 658, 146 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1st Dep't 1955).
Supra note 20.
23 Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 285-86, 200 N.E.2d
427, 429-30, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436-37 (1964).
24 CPLR 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section . . . if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state . . . or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state."
25 See Simonson v. International Bank, supra note 23, at 286-87, 200
N.E.2d at 430, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
26 "[I]f it [the defendant] is here, not occasionally or casually, but with
a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then . . . it is within the
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y.
jurisdiction of our courts . .."
259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917).

